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Summary  
The purpose of my Master Thesis is to examine, in detail, how current 
international law relates to autonomous weapon systems. The background 
for this project is that the requirement of current international humanitarian 
law presupposes that the characters of war, namely soldiers and military 
officers, are human beings. Warfare has, however, changed increasingly 
since the Geneva Conventions were written in August 1949. War is now 
increasingly fought with machines or virtual networks that are somehow 
controlled by humans, and this method of warfare is here to stay. Artificial 
intelligence has made war-machines less dependent on human control and 
thus more autonomous. The use of autonomous weapon systems will cause 
difficulties in establishing responsibility for the implementation of 
humanitarian law when numerous individuals are involved, and when the 
actor is a robot. The question of accountability is therefore essential since 
this issue will arise in the framework of all fully autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems.  
 
The concept of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) will be defined more 
precisely alongside three different forms of autonomy in order to 
demonstrate its compliance with current international law. The analysis will 
begin from the bottom of the decision-making process to gradually 
eliminate all candidates who do not have sufficient knowledge to assume 
accountability. The candidates that will be observed are the military 
personnel, the acquisition team, the programmer or manufacturer, 
corporations, and lastly, the robot. Each chapter will build upon the next and 
include a descriptive part in the beginning with an analysis toward the end 
of the thesis. Parallels will be drawn between the new legal phenomenon 
and existing legal systems.  
 
The thesis will later lead to the conclusion that States cannot absolve 
themselves of their obligations under international humanitarian law when 
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deploying autonomous weapon systems on the field. The State will still 
remain responsible for ensuring that relevant and fundamental standards are 
met and that international law is respected. The thesis will also argue that 
there is no fully autonomous AWS existing at the present time, and AWSes 
can therefore not itself be held accountable for crimes under international 
law. Nevertheless, this new character of warfare will bring real challenges 
for military commanders, not least in how to manage the information to 
ensure proper conduct but also to maintain discipline amongst subordinates. 
 
An effective system of accountability for autonomous weapon systems is 
when the lines for responsibility are well defined. To the extent that the 
autonomy of semi-autonomous causes gaps in current accountability 
instruments, it will be argued that the gaps can be filled through 
establishment of a new framework of command responsibility with a 
technical expert as a vital subordinate. 
 
 
Ajda Hosseini Ghasemi 
  
Sammanfattning  
Syftet med mitt examensarbete är att undersöka i detalj hur gällande folkrätt 
förhåller sig till autonoma vapensystem. Bakgrunden till detta projekt är att 
internationell humanitär rätt förutsätter att aktörerna i kriget, soldater och 
officerare är människor. Krigföring har dock förändrats i allt högre grad 
sedan de första Genèvekonventionerna skrevs i augusti 1949. Krig kämpas 
numera med maskiner eller virtuella nätverk som på något sätt kontrolleras 
av människan, och denna metod av krigföring är här för att stanna. 
Artificiell intelligens har gjort krigsmaskiner mindre beroende av mänsklig 
kontroll och därmed mer självständiga. Den nya användningen av autonoma 
vapensystem kommer att orsaka svårigheter i fastställandet av ansvar för 
implementeringen av humanitär rätt när många enskilda personer är 
inblandade och den som agerar är en robot. Frågan om ansvar således är 
viktigt eftersom frågan kommer att uppstå inom ramen för alla hel- och 
halvautonoma vapen. 
 
Begreppet autonoma vapensystem kommer att preciseras genom tre olika 
former av självständighet för att se användandets överensstämmelse med 
gällande internationell rätt. Analysen kommer att göras i samband med 
bedömningen av den frågeställning som börjar längst ner i beslutsfattandet 
för att senare gradvis eliminera alla kandidater som inte hade tillräckliga 
kunskaper för att åta ansvar. De kandidater som kommer att observeras i 
uppsatsen är den militära personalen, personen/personer som anskaffar 
vapnet, programmeraren eller tillverkaren, företag och slutligen roboten. 
Varje kapitel kommer att innehålla en beskrivande del i början med en 
analys mot slutet av uppsatsen. Paralleller kommer även att dras mellan det 
nya rättsliga fenomenet och befintliga rättssystem. 
 
Uppsatsen utgår sedan till slutsatsen att staterna inte kan frita sig från ansvar 
och skyldigheter enligt internationell humanitär rätt genom upphandlandet 
av autonoma vapensystem på fältet. Staten kommer fortfarande att fortsätta 
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att ansvara för att se till att de relevanta normerna uppfylls och att folkrätten 
respekteras. Uppsatsen kommer även hävda att det inte finns helt 
självständiga AWS existerande i dagsläget, vilket leder till dess oförmåga 
att ställas till svars för brott mot internationell rätt. Dock, kommer den nya 
karaktären av krigföring skapa verkliga utmaningar för militära befälhavare, 
inte minst i hur man ska hantera informationen från vapensystemet för att 
säkerställa operationer men också för att upprätthålla disciplinen bland 
underordnade. 
 
Ett effektivt system för ansvarsskyldighet för det autonoma vapensystemet 
är när linjerna för ansvar är väl definierade och definitiva. I den mån 
halvautonoma vapensystem orsakar ofullständigheter i nuvarande 
ansvarsinstrument, kommer uppsatsen hävda att dessa luckor kan fyllas 
genom inrättandet av ett nytt ramverk av befälsansvar med den tekniska 
experten som en avgörande underordnad. 
Ajda Hosseini Ghasemi 
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Abbreviations 
ATS Alien Tort Statute  
AWS   Autonomous Weapon Systems 
BMC Battle Management & Weapon 
Control 
DOD   The US Department of Defense  
ICL International Criminal Law 
ICRC International Committee of the Red 
Cross 
IHL   International Humanitarian Law 
LAR   Lethal Autonomous Robotics 
LOAC   Laws of Armed Conflict 
LOIAC Law of International Armed 
Conflict 
LOW Law of War 
ROE Rules of Engagement  
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
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1 Introduction  
“We’re entering an era in which unmanned vehicles of all kinds 
will take on greater importance – in space, in the air and on 
land”.1 
First we had humans fighting wars without machinery. Then we had humans 
fighting wars with weapons and machinery. Finally we will have the 
machinery and weapons on battlefields without humans. We are now facing 
a new beginning, entering a new era where warfare will be fought in ways 
that could not have been done earlier. Fully and semi-autonomous weapon 
systems will be fighting wars on the ground, in the sea and up in the air. 
This will result in fewer humans on the battlefield, and more robots that are 
controlled and programmed through computers. This form of warfare may 
be appealing at first, by displaying a new humane alternative to methods of 
war and means of armed conflict; however it will also present dangerous 
scenarios of total catastrophe. What happens when things do not go as 
planned or as programmed? How can you program a reaction to the 
unexpected? Who will be held responsible when something goes wrong? 
These questions raise concerns with regard to international humanitarian 
law. In legal terms, it is still unclear where liability lies; whether it is within 
the military chain or with the software developer/developers.  
 
The new use of autonomous weapon systems will cause difficulties in 
establishing the form of responsibility for the implementation of 
humanitarian law when numerous individuals are involved and the actor is a 
robot. Although the technology behind unmanned systems is rapidly 
developing, there is a slow assessment of their legal aspects. The question of 
accountability is essential since the issue will arise in the framework of all 
fully autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems. This indicates a 
                                                
1 President George W. Bush, Citadel speech, 11 December 2001, available at 
http://www.citadel.edu/root/presbush01, accessed on 2 February 2014.  
Semi-Autonomous Weapon Systems in International Humanitarian Law 
 
11 
 
need for a revised decision-making process, which could be collective, 
individual, or perhaps a new form of decision-making.   
1.1 Research question 
The thesis will examine who can be held responsible for the implementation 
of international humanitarian law when autonomous weapon systems have 
been used. 
1.2 Purpose 
This thesis aims to fill the gaps in current literature by examining in detail 
how current laws, international law and legislation apply to autonomous 
weapon systems and to answer the research question. 
1.3 Method 
I will review and consider the question of responsibility and organization 
regarding autonomous weapons. The thesis will present the changes in 
technology and assume that these changes will on their own exert pressure 
on the traditional decision-making process.  The assessment of the research 
question will start at the bottom of the decision-making process in order to 
gradually eliminate all candidates who will not have the sufficient 
knowledge to assume responsibility before legal responsibility is placed on 
the Head of State.  
 
Each chapter will build upon the next and include a descriptive part in the 
beginning with an analysis toward the end of the thesis. I will draw parallels 
and compare new legal phenomena with existing legal systems.  
 
Not a lot of research has been done in this area, and the limited material that 
is available has been produced in the US and UK. The thesis will also 
Ajda Hosseini Ghasemi 
  
include secondary literature and some case studies, but will mostly rely on 
existing international humanitarian law.  
1.4 Limitations 
In my thesis I intend to carry out a thorough analysis of the legal issues 
involved in the development of new weapons in international humanitarian 
law but will only mention the notion of cyber warfare without discussing it 
further. Different autonomous weapons systems will be mentioned 
throughout the thesis but there will not be any further elaboration on the 
weapons and their functions. The fully autonomous weapon system will be 
briefly discussed; however the thesis’s primary focus will be on traditional 
international warfare between two sovereign States and on the usage of the 
semi- autonomous weapon systems and how this will challenge international 
humanitarian law.   
Semi-Autonomous Weapon Systems in International Humanitarian Law 
 
13 
 
2 New and advanced weapons  
The function of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is to achieve a 
justifiable balance between the necessities of war and humanitarian 
requirements. Thus, the requirements of IHL are intended to ease the human 
suffering caused by war and to humanize war, although the latter term may 
be considered by some as a contradiction. All of this presupposes that the 
actors of the war, the soldiers and military officers, are human. Warfare has, 
however, changed increasingly since the Geneva Conventions were written 
in August 1949.2  
 
War is now increasingly fought with machines or virtual networks that are 
somehow controlled by humans, and this method of warfare is here to stay. 
Artificial intelligence has made the war-machines less dependent on human 
control and thus more autonomous. The Oxford dictionary has defined the 
word autonomous as “having the freedom to govern itself or control its own 
affairs”3. The weapons of the present warfare have developed to a new level 
of autonomy in different ways depending on the weapon.  
 
This chapter will introduce the new notion of autonomous weapon systems 
(AWS). It will illustrate an example of an AWS and describe the different 
types of human involvement in an AWS. 
2.1 The notion of autonomous weapon systems 
in warfare 
Before turning to the real issue of the thesis, it is essential to examine the 
technological context in which the law will be applied. The starting point for 
                                                
2 Available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp, accessed 
on 30 February 2014. 
3 Available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/autonomous, 
accessed on 29 March 2014. 
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any discussion is the definition of the item triggering the concern, in this 
case the weapon system. Although it would be a mistake to assume that 
AWSes will resemble remote pilot systems,4 it could however share some 
similarities. The notion of AWSes or lethal autonomous robotics (LARs)5, 
as it is also called, has been defined by the US Department of Defense as:  
“A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets 
without further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-
supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human 
operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and 
engage targets without further human input after activation.”6 
 
An AWS can also be seen as a machine or robot, since both are items that 
are manufactured by humans. All programmed robotic systems, including an 
AWS, include three parts; 1) the system, which is given instruments through 
programming and can provide information; 2) artificial intelligence or a 
processor that selects how to respond to a given situation; and 3) executions 
that act upon the decision made by either the human operator or the machine 
itself.7  
2.1.1 Different types of human involvement in the AWS 
AWSes are advanced weapon systems that are an improved version of 
previous weapons. The involvement of humans in these systems can be 
divided into three groups, where the participation of the human will be 
described by a so-called loop.   
On the one hand, there is the AWS that has a degree of situational 
awareness, artificial intelligence, or processors that could decide to launch 
                                                
4 Schmitt, Michael N. And Thurnher, Jeffrey S., ”Out of the Loop”: Autonomous 
Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 Harvard National Security 
Journal 23, 2013, page 240 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212188 accessed 
on 10 April 2014. 
5 Both will be treated as synonyms for the purpose of this article. 
6 US Department of Defense, autonomy in weapons systems, directive 3000.09, 
2012, (herein after called Directive 3000.09) pages 13–14  
7 Singer Peter W., Wired for War, Penguin Group Incorporated, 2009, (herein after 
called Singer) page 67. 
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an attack with a press of a button which requires significant human 
involvement in order for it to work, a human in the loop; and on the other 
hand there is the system which is fully autonomous and does not require any 
human participation, and is therefore considered out of the loop.8 It should 
however be noted that the word autonomous or autonomy must be 
distinguished from the words automated or automatic. The term AWS in 
this context does not mean, nor is it meant to include, a concept of a moral 
agency or a free will.9  Current development requires human participation in 
a wider loop, where the robotic system will be programmed with goals and 
the human operator will decide when to activate or deactivate the 
execution.10  
Nevertheless, fully autonomous weapon systems must be separated from 
other categories of weapons; the crucial factor that will distinguish the semi-
autonomous weapons from fully- autonomous weapons is supervision. 
Semi-autonomous weapon systems are systems that will target a potential 
military object automatically and signal its human operator. The human 
operator will then have the possibility of deciding whether he or she wants 
to launch an attack on the target; in other words, the human operator must 
select the attack and press the button. This is in contrast with fully- 
autonomous weapons that interpret the pre-programmed goals into tasks and 
achieve them without requiring any further human intervention.11  
 
 
 
                                                
8 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, 9 April 2013, A/HRC/23/47, (herein after called 
Report A/HRC/23/47) paragraph 39, Available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/51a747c54.html, accessed 8 May 2014.  
9 Singer, (See note 7) page 101.  
10 Report A/HRC/23/47, (See note 8) paragraph 40. 
11 International Committee of the Red Cross, Weapons: ICRC statement to the 
United Nations, 2013, availed at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/united-nations-
weapons-statement-2013-10-16.htm accessed on 6 April 2014.  
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The following table will display the involvement of humans in an AWS, as 
explained above.12 
Scale of AWS 
Automated attack, not supervised Human out-of-the-loop, full 
autonomy 
Automated attack, supervised Human on-the-loop, the autonomy 
is supervised 
Automated targeting only, manned 
attack 
Human in-the-loop, the autonomy is 
supervised  
One example of an AWS that will be illustrated is the Iron Dome from 
Israel. The Iron Dome is a mobile defense solution. The purpose of the 
system is to counter short-range 155 mm artillery shell threats and rockets.  
The system consists of a special missile that detonates any target in the air, 
in all weather conditions, within seconds.  
The system is designed to detect and identify artillery shells or rocket 
launches and their route. The target data is later communicated to the Battle 
Management & Weapon Control (BMC) for processing. Human operators 
estimate the expected impact quickly and analyze the data received from the 
Iron Dome. If the assessment made by the human operators indicates that 
the rocket route will pose a grave threat to Israel, a military command must 
make a choice within seconds and a missile is launched against the threat. 
The system will route updates from BMC.13   
Another example is the United Kingdom’s Taranis jet-propelled combat 
drone prototype that can autonomously search for, identify and trace 
                                                
12 Bolt, Lieutenant-Colonel A., "The Use of Autonomous Weapons and the Role of 
the Legal Advisor", in International Humanitarian Law and the Changing 
Technology of War, (herein after called Bolt) ed. Saxon, Dan, vol. 41, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publisher, 2013, page 130. 
13Available at http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/6/946.pdf, 
accessed on 8 May 2014. 
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enemies; nevertheless, it can only engage in an attack if so authorized by 
mission control. The drone can also defend itself against enemies.14 A third 
example of the weapon system is the Samsung Techwin surveillance and 
security guard robots; they are deployed in the demilitarized zone between 
North and South Korea. These robots will spot targets through infrared 
sensors. The robots have an automatic mode but are currently controlled by 
humans, in other words, they are still semi-autonomous.15 The US 
Department of Defense (DoD) has a great interest in the AWS and has 
allocated approximately $36,424 million on developing and acquiring the 
unmanned systems on the ground, air and sea in 2011.16  
 
                                                
14Available at http://www.baesystems.com/product/BAES_020273/taranis, 
accessed on 2 April 2014. 
15Available at http://singularityhub.com/2010/07/25/armed-robots-deployed-by-
south-korea-in-demilitarized-zone-on-trial-basis, accessed on 2 April 2014.  
16 US Department of Defence, “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-
2036”Reference number 11-S-3613, 2011, page 13. 
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3 Challenges for current 
international humanitarian law 
compliance  
As previously mentioned in the introduction, AWSes will result in less 
human soldiers and more robots acting on the field. The principal challenges 
facing AWSes from a legal perspective are its compliance with IHL, such as 
the principle of distinction and proportionality. Another provision that is 
applicable is Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, which obliges all State 
Parties to determine whether the use of a new weapon, method, or means of 
warfare would be prohibited under IHL.17  
This chapter is a brief introduction locating these principles within IHL, and 
will focus on (1) the principle of distinction; (2) the principle of 
proportionality; (3) the principle of precaution; (4) military necessity; (5) 
the Martens clause; and (6) Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. This chapter 
will also attempt to outline the challenges to these principles that will arise 
with the introduction of AWSes.  
3.1 The principle of distinction  
The principle was initially set forth in the St. Petersburg Declaration, which 
prescribes that: “the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”.18    
 
                                                
17 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (herein after called 
Additional Protocol 1), adopted in 8 June 1977 and entered in force 7 December 
1978.  
18 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, drafted in 1868, Saint Petersburg and entered into force on 
11 December1868, preamble (cited in Schindler, D. and Toman, J., The Laws of 
Armed Conflicts, Martinus Nihjoff Publisher, 1988, page102.) 
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The principle is now codified in Articles 48, 51(2) and 52(2) of Additional 
Protocol I and is a principle that lies at the heart of an armed conflict in a 
targeting operation. To date, no reservations have been made by any State 
Party to this principle.19 
 
The principle recognizes civilian damages or civilian casualties during a 
lawful attack on a military target. Such attacks will be considered lawful if 
they are proportionate in relation to the direct and tangible military 
advantage expected from the attack.20 The distinction between combatants 
and civilians is a crucial feature in international humanitarian law, where the 
former may legally be targeted in military operations and the latter may not, 
with certain exceptions.21 The inability for AWSes to distinguish between 
combatants and civilians because of its need to be pre-programmed might be 
a great obstacle.22 Benjamin Krishnan has stated that “[d]istinguishing 
between a harmless civilian and an armed insurgent could go beyond 
anything machine perception could possibly do.”23.  
 
Can an AWS distinguish between civilians taking direct part in the armed 
conflict and armed civilians such as law enforcement personnel or maybe 
hunters? AWSes have no sensing or visual systems that can make a 
distinction between the actors and non-actors on the field.24 The robots do 
not possess the necessary human qualifications to examine an individual’s 
intention on the field, such as understanding the individual’s emotional 
                                                
19 Additional Protocol 1, (See note 17) Article 48, Article 51(2) and Article 52(2)  
20 Ibid., Article 57(2) 
21 Turns, David, "The Law of Armed Conflict (International Humanitarian Law)", 
in International Law, Ed. Malcolm D. Evans, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 
2010, (herein after called Turns) pages 830-831. 
22 Sharkey, Noel, Grounds for Discrimination: Autonomous Robot Weapons, 2008, 
(herein after called Sharkey) page 87, available at 
http://rusi.org/downloads/assets/23sharkey.pdf, accessed on 2 April 2014. 
23 Krishnan, Armin, Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous 
Weapons, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009, (herein after called Krishnan) page 
99. 
24 Sharkey, (See note 22) page 87. 
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state. This can only be done if the examiner is a human combatant.25 For 
example, an AWS sees an individual running with two other individuals 
away from the robot with unidentified objects in their hands. This is in fact a 
mother that is running after her two children playing with toy guns, to get 
them out of the field. A human combatant would be able to assess the 
situation in question as a harmless act and therefore not a threat, while a 
robot might only see individuals that are running and armed with weapons 
and could launch an attack on the targets.26 It would also be difficult for an 
AWS to identify whether an enemy solider has become hors de combat27 (a 
non-combatant) or if the situation is merely deceitful. For example, an AWS 
locates an enemy combatant, thus launches an attack and misses the 
combatant; however the combatant fakes an injury and lies down. Or in a 
vice-versa situation, an AWS launches an attack that injures a combatant. 
The assessment of the situation is a difficult task for a human solider, let 
alone for an AWS. Nevertheless, a human solider will be able to assess the 
entire context, whereas the AWS will only focus on specific visions or 
aspects because of its programming. 
 
Would the AWS be able to determine whether an enemy combatant is 
making a sincere effort to surrender? All the above-mentioned scenarios are 
difficult, very sensitive, and indeed complex. There is no clear 
characterization of how a civilian should act, look or behave, this needs to 
be determined in each specific situation and on a case-by-case basis. A clear 
definition of who is a civilian is required to be established in order for an 
AWS to be programmed with the capacity to correctly distinguish a 
combatant from a civilian, which today is near to impossible. In other 
words, the necessity for a human commander to be in control remains until 
such requirement is met.  
                                                
25 Guarini, Marcello and Bello, Paul, “Robotic Warfare: Some Challenges in 
Moving from Noncivilian to Civilian Theaters,” (herein after called Guarini) in 
Robot Ethics, eds., Lin, Abney, and Bekey, The MIT Press, 2011, page 138. 
26 Ibid., page 130. 
27 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) article 41.  
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3.2 The principle of proportionality 
This principle is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, and 
affirmed in Article 57. 
 “An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.28   
The Supreme Court of Israel has stated, in the case of Beit Sourik Village 
Council v. Government of Israel29, that the principle of proportionality is 
based on three tests; 1) a request for a fit between means and goal; 2) the 
application of the least damaging means test; and 3) that damage caused to 
the individual by the means commissioned must be of appropriate 
proportion to the advantage gained from it.30 In other words, the principle 
prohibits attacks on military targets if the predictable civilian harm of an 
attack outweighs its expected military advantage.31 The principle also limits 
the incidental collateral damage to protected objects and persons.32  
The context of the situation is vital to determining the proportionality and 
requires the military commander to take all feasible precautions when 
launching and planning an attack, such as warning the civilian population of 
an attack or to suspend or cancel an attack if it becomes evident that the 
attack cannot be executed without disproportionate collateral damage or that 
                                                
28 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 51(5)(b).  
29 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, HCJ 2056/04, Israel: 
Supreme Court, 30 May 2004, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4374ac594.html, accessed 14 May 2014 
30 Shaw N. Malcolm, International Law, 6th ed., Cambridge University Press, 
2008, (herein after called Shaw) page 1182. 
31 Additional Protocol 1, (See note 17) art. 51(5)(b).  
32 International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and 
the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, 31st International Conference 
2011, availed at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-
movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-
11-5-1-2-en.pdf, accessed on 5 April 2014. 
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the object is not a military object.33 When determining the proportionality of 
a military operation, great importance must be attached to the complete 
overall picture and context. The US Air Force has specified that 
“proportionality in attack is an inherently subjective determination that will 
be resolved on a case-by-case basis.”34 In other words, the evaluation of 
what the likely collateral damage will be to civilian objects has to be 
completed before an actual launch of an attack.35  
 
The Diplomatic Conference was the conference where the adoption of the 
Additional Protocols was made. Mexico specified that Article 51 was so 
indispensable that it “cannot be the subject of any reservations whatsoever 
since these would be inconsistent with the aim and purpose of Protocol I and 
undermine its basis”.36 The United Kingdom followed Mexico and stated 
that Article 51(5)(b) was “a useful codification of a concept that was rapidly 
becoming accepted by all States as an important principle of international 
law relating to armed conflict”.37 These statements illustrate the importance 
of Article 51 of Additional Protocol I.  
3.2.1 The principle of precaution 
The principle of precaution obligates each State party to a conflict to take all 
feasible precautions to protect both the civilian population and objects under 
                                                
33 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 57.  
34 Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Department, “Air Force Operations and the 
Law: A Guide for Air and Space Forces” first edition, 2002, 
http://web.law.und.edu/Class/militarylaw/web_assets/pdf/AF%20Ops%20&%20La
w.pdf (accessed March 27, 2014), p.27. 
35 International Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal 
Center and School, US Army Charlottesville, Virginia, VIRGINIA LTC Bovarnick, 
Jeff A. Et al., Law of war deskbook, (herein after called LOW) Ed., CAPT Bill, 
Brian J., 2010, page 155. 
36 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie et al., Customary International Humanitarian Law: 
Volume 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, 2005, (herein after called 
Henckaerts) page 37  
37 Ibid., page 4  
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its control against the effects of any attacks.38 The article states the 
following; 
“[…] (i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be 
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not 
subject to special protection but are military objectives within 
the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not 
prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them;  
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to 
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians 
and damage to civilian objects; 
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated;  
(b)  an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes 
apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to 
special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated;  
(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks that may 
affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not 
permit.  
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives 
for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be 
selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to 
cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects. 
                                                
38 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 58(c). 
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4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each 
Party to the conflict shall, in conformity with its rights and 
duties under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of 
civilian lives and damage to civilian objects. 
5. No provision of this Article may be construed as authorizing 
any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian 
objects.” 
 
The principle has been restated in numerous military manuals.39 One 
example is The US Naval Handbook from 1995 which prescribes: “All 
reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure that only military objectives 
are targeted so that civilians and civilian objects are spared as much as 
possible from the ravages of war.”40 
 
It is very unlikely that an AWS could be pre-programmed in a way to be 
able to comply with the principles of proportionality and precaution whilst 
managing a number of different unforeseeable scenarios. For example: 
imagine an AWS that has identified a military leader in a building located in 
the capital of the state and the program therefore decides to launch an attack. 
The AWS will now face two problems. Firstly, the target is located in a 
capital city that indicates a crowded area, which means that the situation on 
the ground will change constantly; civilian cars moving, bicycles or even 
school buses driving in the vicinity of the target. Secondly, the AWS must 
also assess the expected military advantages of attacking a targeted person 
against casualties and the number of civilians.  
 
The AWS’s inability to evaluate a variety of different circumstances will 
interfere with its ability to comply with the principle of distinction. The 
                                                
39 Available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter6_rule22, accessed on 2 April 2014.  
40 United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 
NWP 1-14M7MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued b the Department of the 
Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine 
Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995, §8.1. 
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interpretation of the shifting and complex scenarios will consistently invoke 
and require human judgment. The ICRC commentary has stated that making 
a decision regarding proportionality is based on common sense and the good 
faith of military commanders.41 Professor Michael Schmitt has stated, 
“While the rule is easily stated, there is no question that proportionality is 
among the most difficult of LOIAC [law of international armed conflict] 
norms to apply.42 
3.3 Military necessity 
Military necessity is part of the assessment of proportionality, not an 
independent principle of IHL. It requires an assessment of the situation at 
hand. The military necessity principle, which is part of the legal justification 
for targeting an object, demands an analysis of the situation. The principle 
of military necessity forbids the use of unnecessary force.43 For example, a 
goal will not be legitimate because its aggressor brings a military advantage. 
It may for example be a military advantage to attack civilians serving in an 
armor factory, but it is still illegal under the principle of distinction. 
 
The principle has also been described as “a content-dependent, value based 
judgment of a commander”.44 The AWS must be able to first identify a 
                                                
41 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,(herein 
after called (Commentary on the Additional Protocols) pages 679-682, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750073?OpenDocument, accessed on 4 April 
2014. 
42 Schmitt, Michael N., “Fault lines in the Law of Attack”, in Testing the 
Boundarieas of International Humanitarian Law, Breau, Susan & Jachec-Neale, 
Agnieszka, eds., British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2006, 
page 293 
43 Gillespie, Tony and West, Robin, Requirements for Autonomous Unmanned Air 
Systems Set by Legal Issues, The International C2 Journal, vol. 4, nr 2, 2010, 
(hereinafter called Gillespie) page 9, available on 
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/IC2J_v4n2_02_Gillespie.pdf, accessed on 4 April 
2014. 
44 Kastan, Benjamin N., "Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Coming Legal 
Singularity?”, 2012, (herein after called Kastan), Journal of Law, Technology and 
Policy 45, 2013, page 17, available on  
http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_kastan/1, accessed March 27, 2014. 
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military target, and second to assess whether the destruction of this target 
could result in a definite military advantage.45 If the AWS cannot decide 
whether the target is a cultural object, medical facility, civilian, or military, 
then it will not be able to decide whether the destruction of the target would 
result in a military necessity or a military advantage.46  
3.4 Martens clause 
This is the clause that encompasses rules outside those found in 
international treaties. The clause requires that means of warfare should be 
evaluated along with the dictates of public conscience and in 
correspondence with the principles of humanity.47  
“Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the 
High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases 
not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations 
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity 
and the requirements of the public conscience.”48  
 
Experts and others have expressed strong opinions about weapon systems 
complementarity to the Martens Clause and on whether AWSes should be 
given the mandate to take the decision on when to launch an attack without 
the supervision of a human. It is still unclear what this means in reality; 
however, large majorities think that the idea of an automated decision is 
unacceptable and shocking.49  
                                                
45 LOW, (See note 35) page 140. 
46 Gillespie, (See note 43) pages 9-10. 
47 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) article 1(2)  
48 International Review of the Red Cross, No. 317, The Martens Clause and Laws 
of Armed Conflict by Ticehurst Rubert, 1997, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnhy.htm , accessed on 13 
May 2014 
49 Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, 2012 
page 35, available at 
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3.5 Article 36 of additional protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions 
Article 36 of additional protocol I prescribes that States should review new 
and modified weapons. 
“In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new 
weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party 
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment 
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this 
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to 
the High Contracting Party.”50 
 
AWSes should be subject to such review, which also has been specially 
highlighted by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
 
This principle applies to all States, irrespectively of them being a party to 
the Protocol or not.51 The ICRC has argued that the obligation is binding for 
all States because “the faithful and responsible application of its 
international law obligations would require a State to ensure that the new 
weapons, means and methods of warfare it develops or acquires will not 
violate these obligations.”52 The evaluation of the weapons should take 
place at an early stage of their development and continue throughout the 
whole process.53 In other words, the time is now.  
 
                                                                                                                        
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf, accessed 
on 2 February 2014. 
50 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 36. 
51 Commentary on the Additional Protocols, (See note 41) pages 427-428.  
52 International Committee of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New 
Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of 
Additional Protocol I of 1977, 2006, (herein after called A Guide to the Legal 
Review of New Weapons) page 4, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0902.pdf, accessed on 30 April 
2014. 
53Ibid., page 24. 
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The purpose of this principle is to evaluate whether or not the weapon 
should be prohibited under IHL and to safeguard IHL. Firstly, States should 
study prohibitions in IHL and other treaties for already existing weapons.54 
However, there is no existing treaty today that forbids AWSes as a whole. 
Secondly, States should then, evaluate AWS compliance with other treaties 
and international customary law. The rules accepted, in particular under 
international customary law, are the principles of distinction, proportionality 
and military necessity, also known as the cornerstones of IHL. Indeed, the 
Martens clause might be relevant too.55 States shall then cease the 
development of any weapon that fails to meet legal requirements and stop 
investing any further in the technology.    
 
Is Article 36 enough to safeguard IHL? AWSes can comply with all relevant 
international instruments but still be a problem under IHL due to issues 
relating to accountability. Article 36 will only focus on the weapon’s 
development and employment and not other issues.  
 
 
                                                
54 A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, (See note 52) page 24. 
55 Ibid., pages 16-17. 
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4 The problem with  
accountability realating to the 
conduct of the AWS 
AWSes are a new and multifaceted weapons system, as explained in chapter 
2.1, which despite its superior skills, will sooner or later reach the point 
where malfunction is imminent. This is when, and why, the question of 
accountability will become an issue.  
AWSes are produced and deployed through a number of people such as the 
military commander, the acquisition team, the programmer, and the 
manufacturer. The number of people involved in the process of creating an 
AWS and the semi-autonomous system itself will create an accountability 
vacuum because of its segment of autonomy. All of the candidates and items 
previously mentioned have a central role in the acts of an AWS that causes 
difficulties in establishing the accountability for an unlawful act caused by 
an AWS.  
One question that remains unanswered is who may be held accountable 
when innocent people are injured.  
This chapter will focus on the issue of accountability of AWSes. 
4.1 State responsibility 
State responsibility is a fundamental regulation of international law. The 
notion has developed from the doctrine of sovereignty and equality of States 
from the public international legal systems, and is a general rule of 
international law. A violation of international law will be followed by 
procedural and other consequences, such as reparations and so forth.56  
                                                
56 Shaw, (See note 30) page 778. 
Ajda Hosseini Ghasemi 
  
Article 8 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 57, specifies that; 
 ”The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be 
considered an act of a State under international law if the person 
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.”58 
 
The commentary to the article highlights the following, “Such conduct will 
be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled the specific 
operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of the 
operations”59. Hence, State responsibility exists independently of any 
individual criminal liability or intent.60   
 
States are consequently responsible for its military and other agents, and 
thus liable for any and all violations of IHL.61 This means that any State that 
deploys its armed forces with unmanned AWSes will be held liable as a 
matter of State responsibility for breaches of IHL. Nevertheless, States also 
have an obligation to disseminate and provide instructions to its armed 
forces in the field, such as imparting and implementing training programs, 
which include training in the law of armed conflicts (LOAC)62, combined 
with appropriate instructions. Another obligation for States while 
implementing and upholding IHL is to investigate and to punish violations 
                                                
57 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts  
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001)  
(extract from the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
Fifty-third session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1) (herein after called Draft Articles) 
58 Ibid.,  
59 Shaw, (See note 30) page 790. 
60 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted in 
The Hague 18 September 1907, entered into force in 16 January 1910, (herein after 
The Hague IV) Article 3.  
61 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 91. 
62 Turns, (See note 21) page 842. 
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that have been committed by the State. The legal process could occur in 
either the national court or in international criminal courts. 63  
4.1.1 Responsibility of the acquisitioned  
As mentioned in chapter 3.5, Article 36 of the additional protocol 1 requires 
the State to review the legality of the weapon, the AWS, at various phases 
of the weapon’s development and deployment.64 The phrase “in some or all 
circumstances”65 in the article obliges all States to determine the legality of 
both the use and the anticipated use of the weapon at all phases of the 
process. The Third Committee of the Diplomatic Conference explained the 
following about the article: 
 
“It should be noted that [article 36] is intended to require States 
to analyse whether the employment of a weapon for its normal 
or expected use would be prohibited under some or all 
circumstances. A State is not required to foresee or analyse all 
possible misuses of a weapon, for almost any weapon can be 
misused in ways that would be prohibited.”66 
 
In other words, the language of Article 36 has been interpreted to mean that 
States must consider the expected use of the weapon as well, which is the 
use that will go beyond normal use and the designed uses. States must 
assess the legality of the weapons in the context of a few imaginable 
misuses.67 
                                                
63  See for example, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, adopted in Geneva 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 
September 1950, Article 146. 
64 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 36.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Report to the Third Committee on the Work of the Working Group Committee 
III, Doc No CDDH/III/293 in Levie, Howard S., Protection of War Crimes: 
Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Ocena Publications, 1980, vol 2, page 
287 
67 Fry, James D., The XM25 individual semi-automatic airburst weapon system and 
international law: Landing on the wrong planet?, University of New South Wales 
Law Journal, vol. 36(2), 2013, available at 
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The form of liability could also differ depending on whether it is a 
department making the decision or a sole person; however one fact that will 
not change is the need for expertise knowledge. How can an individual with 
no expert technical knowledge notice that something is wrong with the 
AWS? The individual or team acquiring the AWS will be held liable if the 
anticipated use of the weapon points toward incompatibilities with 
international instruments and cannot therefore escape liability by lack of 
knowledge but instead needs to assess the weapon before employing it and 
during the entire process.  
4.2 Individual responsibility 
The question of individual responsibility relating to unmanned AWSes is a 
multidimensional issue, which will raise some complex and inevitable 
issues for international law. As the robot system is semi-autonomous and 
deployed through a number of persons who are involved in different parts of 
the process, this will result in a vacuum arising with regards to the question 
of accountability. The fact that an AWS will carry the human decision-
making responsibilities will cause difficulties in holding someone liable for 
violations of international law caused by actions of the AWS. 
 
There are a few conceivable candidates to hold responsible for an AWS’s 
wrongful acts. These candidates are the combatant, military commanders, 
the AWS’s programmer or manufacturer, the corporation, or possibly the 
robot itself. The next section will review the different candidates for liability 
under IHL.   
4.2.1 Military personal 
As with acts of the armed forces, all acts committed by an entity or person, 
that by law has been empowered by governmental authority are attributable 
                                                                                                                        
http://www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/13_fry_unswlj_362.pdf, 
accessed on 2 April 2014, pages 701-702. 
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to the State.68 This means that the actions of the military personnel are 
attributed to the State and the State will be held accountable for violations of 
international law. This section will deliberate on the role and accountability 
of the combatant and the military commander. 
4.2.1.1 Combatant 
Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Regulations69 defines a combatant as; “1) To be 
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 2) to have a fixed 
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 3) to carry arms openly; and 
4) to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or 
form part of it, they are included under the denomination “army.””70 
Combatants are required to comply with correct conduct of hostilities. The 
fundamental principle forming the basis of these rules is Article 35 of the 
Additional Protocol I. The article states the following; 
“1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict 
to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. 2. It is 
prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering. 3. It is prohibited to employ methods or 
means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.”71  
A combatant is also prohibited from using the presence of civilian persons 
to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.72 
AWSes can be used in two different scenarios. The first scenario is where 
the solider is the main fighter on the field and is using the AWS as a method 
                                                
68 Draft Articles, (See note 57) articles 4 and 5. 
69 The Hague IV, (See note 59). 
70 Ibid., Article 1.  
71 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 35. 
72 Ibid., Article 51, Paragraph 7. 
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of war. In this scenario section 3 of Article 35 of Additional Protocol I is of 
particular relevance for the combatant using the AWS. As mentioned in 
section 3.5, relating to Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I, the review of 
the weapons is once again very important. The combatant may be held liable 
for using an AWS; if the combatant is aware of the chance that the AWS 
will work differently on the field then what it is designed to do.  
The second scenario is when the AWS is employed as a fighter on the field 
along side the combatants. It would be unreasonable to hold a combatant 
liable for another combatant’s actions, let alone for an item such as the 
AWS. However, there could be a possibility for a combatant to be held 
liable if the combatant could foresee or noticed an error or inaccuracy with 
the AWS and withholds the information from his or her commanders.  
4.2.1.2 Military commander 
Another option for holding someone individually accountable for a 
wrongful act is through the military commanders who are the ones that 
deploy the autonomous weapon systems on the battlefield.73 Military 
commanders are responsible for controlling the behavior of their 
subordinates, and are thus liable for their failure.74 The principle of holding 
the commander responsible for his or her subordinates’ conduct applies if 
the military commander had knowledge or should have known that the 
individual planned a wrongful act but did nothing to hinder it.75  The 
military commander will be held liable if he or she: 1) personally sees or 
hears of unlawful acts being committed by his/her subordinates; 2) obtains 
reports of unlawful conduct of his or her troops through his or her 
subordinates, such as officers and staff, yet fails to prevent a violation; or 3) 
the military commander neglects or is reckless about his or her troops and is 
unaware of their actions. 76 
                                                
73 Sparrow, Robert, Killer Robots, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 1, 
2007, (herein after called Sparrow) page 70. 
74 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 86(2)  
75 Ibid., Articles 86(2) and 87.  
76 Turns, (See note 21) page 842.  
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Can an AWS be considered a subordinate to the military commander? 
Subordinate has been defined as “1) placed in or belonging to a lower order 
or rank, 2) of less importance; secondary, 3) subject to or under the 
authority of a superior, 4) subservient or inferior, 5) subject; dependent, 8) a 
subordinate person or thing”77.  The definition of subordinate includes the 
word thing; which could in fact also apply to the AWS, making it 
subordinate to the commander.  
 
The fact that an AWS, which is truly fighting on the ground, is semi-
autonomous, will cause complications in establishing the accurate legal 
accountability for the military commander for acts of such AWS. This is due 
to the fact that the military commander cannot be held legally responsible 
for actions of machineries over which he or she did not have sufficient 
control or most likely did not understand, such as an AWS.78  
 
On the other hand, the principle of command responsibility might apply in 
situations of autonomous weapons too. For example, it could apply in 
situations where the commander was aware in advance that the AWS might 
potentially perform unlawful actions against civilians and yet decides to 
deploy it anyway. This could entail legal accountability for the 
commander.79 The United States has accepted the principle that those 
involved in AWS operations may be held accountable for their decisions. 
The Department of Defense has emphasized that “persons who authorize the 
use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with 
the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and 
applicable rules of engagement (ROE).”80 
 
                                                
77 Definition taken from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/subordinate?s=t, 
accessed on 28 April 2014. 
78 Andreas, Matthias, The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the 
Actions of Learning Automata, Journal of Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 
6, 2004 pages 176 and 183.  
79 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Articles 86(2) and 87. 
80 Directive 3000.09, (See note 6) page 13–14  
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Nevertheless, an ordinary commander might not possess the knowledge to 
be able to identify a threat pre-deployed because he or she did not program 
it, hence the inability to spot inaccuracies.81 Thus the commander would not 
be able to hinder the actions of the AWS once it is on the battlefield, which 
he or she could have with a combatant.82 The following scenario may 
illustrate what a situation like this might look like. The AWS identifies a 
target incorrectly and launches an attack; the military commander in charge 
fails to prevent this, which consequently ends with innocent civilian deaths. 
If the military commander was aware that the target was identified 
incorrectly before an actual launch but did not take the necessary 
precautions needed to prevent it, then the military commander would be 
held accountable for the unlawful act. However, it is almost impossible for a 
military commander to stop an attack after deciding to launch it. 
Correspondingly, whether the commander can be held responsible for acts 
of the AWS depends entirely on the technical configuration and other 
sources of information presented to the military commander before the 
actual launch. 
4.2.2 The programmer or the manufacturer 
An unlawful attack could also be the consequence of design or 
programming errors and/or flaws. The belief that an unlawful act is the 
reason for a violation of IHL would place responsibility on the programmer 
or the manufacturer of the AWS, which could be a very complex issue. The 
individual manufacturer, who otherwise is a civilian, will undoubtedly lay 
the foundation for the whole system; however, the AWS will still be semi-
autonomous, which means that it will be operated by another human 
operator, as reviewed in chapter 2.1 of this thesis. 
                                                
81 Report A/HRC/23/47, (See note 8) paragraph 78. 
82 Ibid., paragraph 41. 
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4.2.2.1.1 Civil liability  
This form of liability is new, and represents one possibility for holding 
programmer or manufacturer responsible for IHL violations occurring as a 
consequence of negligence from the programming.83  
 
Conversely, the notion of being held liable for creations would induce 
programmers or manufacturers to construct exceptionally reliable AWSes in 
order to avoid liability.  
4.2.2.1.2 Criminal liability 
The laws regulating International Criminal Law (ICL) are all based on the 
vital fact that no one should be held liable for an unlawful act that he or she 
neither committed, nor participated in the planning of. Furthermore, no 
liability exists for omissions that cannot be attributed to him or her.84 
However, it is highly implausible that any company or manufacturer would 
sell any weapon that is naturally unsafe, knowing that the company or 
manufacturer could be held criminally liable for its use.85 Further, it would 
be unreasonable to hold someone responsible when they are geographically 
displaced from and have a lack of knowledge of IHL, and of the rules of 
engagement (ROE).   
 
Programmers or manufacturers of AWSes undoubtedly have proficient 
knowledge about the system that relates to each AWS, and could somehow 
detect inaccuracies or miscalculations in the system because they know how 
it should be. However, to hold them responsible for the actions of the AWS 
after they have sold it, when they cannot control or oversee its actions 
would be unfair, ineffective and unlawful. Furthermore, the UK Joint 
Doctrine on unmanned aircraft systems has affirmed that the responsibility 
for programmers and manufacturers will be discharged as soon as the 
                                                
83 Report A/HRC/23/47, (See note 8) paragraph 79.  
84 Cryer, Robert, "International Criminal Law”, in International Law, Ed. Evens 
Malcolm D., 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2010, (herein after called Cryer) 
pages 765-769.  
85 Krishnan, (See note 23) page 43. 
Ajda Hosseini Ghasemi 
  
country’s relevant civilian air authorities or national military has permitted 
the weapon systems.86  
4.2.3 Corporations 
Programmers and manufacturers will assumingly have a position in a 
corporation. How will this affect the corporation? In what ways can the 
corporation be held liable? Assuming that the weapon system, as part of its 
discharge to the military, has been through a legal review and proven 
lawful87, most weapon manufactures and programmers would consider that 
their liability would end there.  
4.2.3.1 Civil liability for corporations 
One State that recognizes exceptions under its Federal Tort Claims Act for 
government contractors, in cases where certain criteria are fulfilled, is the 
United States, thus barring courts from hearing liability claims.88  
 
The notion of a “government contractor” received its definition through the 
case Boyle v United Technologies Corporation.89 The petitioner in the case 
was David Boyle, a marine helicopter pilot. Boyle died when he crashed in a 
helicopter manufactured by United Technologies Corporation, the 
respondent.  The Court concluded that regardless of the absence of specific 
legislation protecting government contractors from liability for design flaws, 
the question of their liability is still of a distinctive federal concern. The 
Court added that such claims could be barred if "[(1)] the United States 
approved reasonably precise specifications for the equipment; [(2)] the 
                                                
86 Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 (JDN 2/11), The UK approach to unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS), 2011, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/337
11/20110505JDN_211_UAS_v2U.pdf, accessed on 30 April 2014, paragraph 510. 
87 Singer, (See note 7) page125. 
88 Chu, Vivian S. And Manuel, Kate M., Torts Suits Against Federal Contractors: 
An Overview of the legal issues, Congressional Research Report R41755, 2011, 
(herein after called Chu) page 12 
89Boyle Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corporation, 487 U.S. 500. U.S. Supreme Court: June 27, 1988 
 
Semi-Autonomous Weapon Systems in International Humanitarian Law 
 
39 
 
equipment conformed to those specifications; and [(3)] the supplier warned 
the United States about dangers in the use of the equipment that were known 
to the supplier but not to the United States."'90 This means that the notion 
would apply for all claims brought against manufactures and programmers 
of AWSes under US law. 
The United States has another specific exception in its tort law relating to 
combat activities. The exception, in rule 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)91, excludes tort 
liability for contractors in claims arising out of combatant activates of the 
military forces during times of war.92. This was the case with the liability of 
Varian Associates Inc, who was the manufacturer of the Aegis Air Defense 
System. The manufacturer was excluded liability for the alleged design 
flaws in the system, USS Vincennes, which shot down an Iranian civilian 
aircraft, thereby killing 290 civilians.93 
4.2.3.2 Criminal liability for corporations 
Corporations in general cannot be prosecuted before an international court, 
as a rule of international law; neither can current international criminal law 
impose criminal liability on corporations. Article 25 of the Rome Statute 
recognizes individual criminal responsibility and defines it as follows: 
“(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally 
responsible;”94 All the same, corporations cannot be criminally liable for 
unlawful actions under international law. 
                                                
90 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the Government Contractor Defense: An 
Analysis Based on the Current Circuit Split Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 
Sean Watts, William and Mary Law Review, Volume 40 | Issue 2 Article 9, 1999, 
page 689.	  
91 Information available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2680, 
accessed on 25 April 2014. 
92 Chu, (See note 87), pages 13-14.  
93 Bentzlin v Hughes Aircraft Co, 833 F. Supp 1486 (C.D. Cal. 1993) 
94 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome 17 July 1988, 
entered into force 1 July 2002. 
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4.2.3.2.1 The Alien tort statute 
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") is a law first adopted in 1789, which grants 
jurisdiction to federal district courts for “all causes where an alien sues for a 
tort only in violation of the law of a nation or of a treaty of the United 
States”. Broadly speaking, this is a law that grants universal jurisdiction to 
federal district courts to hear lawsuits filed by non-US citizens on violations 
of international law.95 It has also been used as a tool to sue transnational 
corporations for violations of international law in countries other than the 
United States. The territorial presence required for the Court to have 
jurisdiction is minimal; for example, it can be enough to have an office in 
the United States.96  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in the case 
of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co.97 (Shell) has rejected this 
embedded understanding of the ATS as a worldwide cause of action. The 
judgment specified that claims without some significant connection to the 
United States are not unlawful under the ATS, and therefore dismissed 
the Kiobel plaintiffs’ claims against foreign defendants. 
4.2.4 The robot  
The idea that the robot itself should be held accountable has been brought 
up a few times. Krishnan writes;  
“At the moment, it would obviously be nonsensical to do this, 
since any robot that exists today, or that will be built in the next 
10-20 years, is too ignorant to possess anything like 
intentionality or real capacity for agency. However, this might 
                                                
95  Information about the Alien Tort Statue is taken from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alien_tort_statute, accessed on 21 May 2013. 
96Branson, Douglas M., Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable – 
Achilles' Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, vol. 1, issue 8, Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law, 2011, (herein after called Branson) page 227, 
available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals
/scjil9&div=12&id=&page=, accessed on 30 May 2013. 
97 Kiobel, Individually and on the behalf of her late husband Kiobel, et al. v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, Co. et al., No. 10–1491, U.S: SUPREME COURT 17 April 2013 
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change in a more distant future once robots become more 
sophisticated and intelligent.”98  
 
It is important to accentuate that when mentioning the robot as a plausible 
candidate, the focus is then on the fully autonomous AWS. Ronald Arkin is 
a scholar that has argued that the robot could easily meet legal standards. 
“The application of lethal force as a response must be constrained by LOW 
[law of war] and ROE [rules of engagements] before it can be employed by 
autonomous systems.”99 He argues further that this can be achieved through 
an ethical governor. This would entail the weapon system following a two-
step program. 
 
The first step is that the fully AWS must evaluate the information it senses 
and has processed in order to determine whether a launch of an attack is 
lawful under international law and ROE. If the attack in question is lawful 
under international law and ROE, the system can then proceed with the 
launch if the attack is under military operational orders.100 The second step 
is that the fully AWS must then evaluate the attack under the principle of 
proportionality101.  The “ethical governor” will calculate a variety of criteria, 
such as the risk of injury to civilians or civilian objects, or the likelihood of 
a military effective attack, all this based on technical data. It will later use an 
algorithm that will combine the “incoming perceptual information” with the 
statistical data. The weapon system can only launch an attack if the target 
“satisfies all ethical constraints and minimizes collateral damage in relation 
to the military necessity of the target”.102 
 
                                                
98 Krishnan, (See note 23) page 105. 
99 Arkin, Ronald C., Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, CRC 
Press, 2009, (herein after called Arkin) page 69. 
100  Ibid., pages 183-184.  
101 See chapter 3.2 
102 Arkin, (See note 98) page 187.  
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Nevertheless, as a machine, an AWS cannot be held accountable for 
violations or be prosecuted if IHL is violated.103 However, let’s assume that 
an AWS would be capable of carrying out military attacks without any 
human intervention in the process. It will then by itself have the capacity to 
carry out the decision-making, to first identify a military target and later 
carry out the attack on this military target. What if something goes wrong? 
Can the AWS be held responsible?  
 
At the present time, we may conclude that an AWS will not have an 
independent wish to kill civilians.104 Furthermore, an AWS’s decision-
making could be as simple as: IF object on right - THEN turn to the left, IF 
object is running THEN launch an attack, ELSE continue. The robot will 
therefore be incompetent to be held accountable for crimes under 
international humanitarian or criminal law.105 
 
                                                
103 International Committee of the Red Cross, Autonomous weapons: states must 
address major humanitarian, ethical challenges, 2013, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/q-and-a-autonomous-
weapons.htm, accessed on 1 May 2014.  
104 Singer, (See note 7) page 388. 
105 Cryer, (See note 83) pages762-764. 
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5 New and existing forms of 
responsibility  
Technological innovations are an integral part of our everyday life and have 
a great principal importance for individuals and our society. Creativity and 
innovation are important for long-term economic growth and help to create 
space for the effective protection of fundamental values. AWSes are within 
the framework of fundamental values and rights protected by international 
conventions and customary law, which express the international 
community's attention and commitment globally. 
Technological development is something very positive and a worthwhile 
endeavor; however, it must remain under control and within the sphere of 
accountability, in order to safeguard the rule of law. In other words, if man 
does not master AWSes and the technology behind them, but permits them 
to master him, he will be destroyed by technology.106 
 
The issue with accountability is truly a complex question, as raised 
throughout the thesis, where established forms of liability may no longer be 
appropriate to the situation with AWSes.  
 
This chapter will discuss new and existing forms of responsibility.  
 
                                                
106  Commentary on the Additional Protocols, (See note 41) paragraph 1476.  
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5.1 Individual responsibility in compliance 
with international humanitarian law 
Chapter 4.2 goes through the different plausible candidates to hold 
accountable for the wrongful acts of AWSes. One issue that has not been 
covered by chapter 4.2 is how liability of the different candidates will 
comply with IHL.  
Military personnel, such as combatants and military commanders, are all 
actors who have been the main actors in the field during wartime since the 
beginning of war. Their rights and duties are therefore well established 
under IHL.107 The regulations on this area even include rules on the 
treatment of combatants that have been imprisoned.108  
The same goes for the liabilities of State organs, such as the acquirer whose 
liability is also well established under IHL since his or her work is attached 
and he or she works for the State.109 However, there are some plausible 
liabilities that have been brought up during the thesis with regards to 
AWSes, such as, liability with regards to the programmer or manufacturer, 
corporations, and the robot. These are all actors and items that are new to 
the well-established IHL, which could indeed hinder possible liability if the 
criteria are not meet. This chapter will discuss the new liabilities compliance 
with IHL.  
5.1.1.1 The programmer or manufacturers liability  
The programmer or manufacturer has always been seen as a civilian, a 
person that will not and should not have any connection to warfare. That is 
however an aspect that has changed during recent years, where the 
programmers and manufacturers play a bigger role in relation to weapons 
and weapon systems. The programmers or manufacturers are of course 
                                                
107  Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 86(2) and art 87. 
108 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted in 
Geneva 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 September 1950, 
109 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Article 36. 
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human, which can be seen as one of the criteria for compliance under IHL. 
However, will the programmer or manufacturer need a rank within the 
military chain to be held liable? Is the programmer or manufacturer within 
the military chain? 
Chapter 4.2.2 mentioned that the programmer or manufacturer could be held 
liable under ICL, which is under IHL. There has been an express view that 
the programmer or manufacturer should be charged under the State’s 
national criminal law for manslaughter for recklessness in their 
programming, causing the systems to commit serious errors resulting in 
injury or death.110 
In other words, there could be liability under international law for 
programmers and manufactures.  
5.1.1.2 The corporation’s liability  
Chapter 4.2.3 presented that corporations cannot be held accountable for 
unlawful actions under IHL, as a general rule under international law. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 4.2.3.2.1 the ATS has been used 
effectively in cases involving torture and extrajudicial killing, State-
sponsored sexual violence, arbitrary detention, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. For example, transnational corporations have under this 
law been sued for being involved and having operated in areas where human 
rights violations have occurred.  
Nevertheless, there is no recognized liability under international law for 
corporations.  
5.1.1.3 The robot’s liability  
The idea that a robot shall be held responsible for unlawful actions of IHL is 
an idea that is quite absurd. It has however been argued from various 
scholars as a form of liability, even though it is a thing. Let’s bear in mind 
                                                
110 Geneva Adademy, Experts meeting on Armed drones and Robots under 
International law, Divonne, France, 2013, Summary of discussions, Prepared by 
Trascasa, Milena C, paragraph 17. 
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that today it is hard to establish liability for a corporation that consists of 
individuals because of the lack of knowledge of who actually ordered it, let 
alone a robot, a weapon system, an item that is built and programmed by 
humans. Even though the AWS might be fully autonomous in the future, 
there will still be a human somewhere in the process that has decided for it 
to be so.  
 
No treaty has covered this kind of liability for an item and the likelihood 
that any treaty ever will is very small.   
5.2 Collective responsibility 
As mentioned in the chapter 1, 2.1 and 4.2, the AWS will cause difficulties 
in establishing accountability for a wrongful act. The previous chapter, 
chapter 5.1, displayed that one individual, whether a military commander or 
a technical expert, cannot be held accountable for the acts of an AWS 
because of its multi-faceted features. Each of the plausible candidates 
identified above are either unsuitable or unreasonable. This could in fact 
create a responsibility vacuum. There is however one option left, namely to 
apply collective responsibility on the wrongful acts of the AWS. This 
section will deliberate on two plausible collective forms of accountability 
for the AWS. 
5.2.1 The role of a legal advisor 
The procedure that could be used to ensure the AWS’s compliance with IHL 
and eventually solve the accountability issue includes the role of a legal 
advisor in ensuring the principles of IHL. Article 82 of Additional Protocol I 
prescribes the following requirement for the legal advice: 
  
“The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the 
conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers 
are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at 
the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and 
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this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to 
the armed forces on this subject.”  
 
Although this article only applies to the parties to the protocol; it is likely 
that this rule could apply as customary law as well.111 Nevertheless, the 
legal advice, if correctly given, should result in protection and form legal 
accountability.  
 
The legal advice relating to an AWS can be given at three stages. The first 
stage is when the decision of deploying the AWS is made, the second stage 
is when the system is given its mission orders, and the third stage is when 
the robot is on the field.112 All AWSes will be able to process the legal 
advice in the second stage; however, only the supervised AWS will be 
affected by decisions while the systems are on the field. In other words, no 
legal advice can be given to a fully autonomous AWS while on the field; it 
can only be given at the mission order stage.113 
5.2.1.1 Mission order stage  
This is the stage where the legal advisor will have the best chance to 
influence the AWS and make the system’s legal review.114 For example; it 
has been decided that the AWS will be deployed in an area where there will 
a number of civilians near the targeted object. The legal advisor will then 
have to be concerned with how the AWS is expected to act on the mission, 
including the overall failure rate, as well as how accurate the orders will fit 
the weapon system, such as how good is the targeting data that has been 
programmed to the AWS to use facial recognition.115   
 
                                                
111  Bolt, (See note12) page135. 
112 Ibid., page 126. 
113 Ibid., page 131. 
114 Ibid., page 132. 
115 Ibid. 
Ajda Hosseini Ghasemi 
  
The mission order stage could also include the length of the mission, what 
and whom the AWS can attack, and how the AWS will react to threats 
against itself.116 
5.2.1.2 Field stage 
As previously mentioned in chapter 5.2.1, this stage can only be applied to 
the semi-autonomous weapon systems. One model of the legal advisor’s 
function is for the advisor to place her- or himself in a command position, in 
fact. The supervised AWS will then have the legal advisor, acting as the 
AWS’s human in-the-loop, and the advisor will embody an operating role. 
This form could however be questioned because of the command 
delegation, where the military commander will cease its role and where the 
legal advisor will act independently. 
 
Another option could then be that the legal advisor could take the position 
next to the military commander and still be able to influence the decision- 
making, in effect.  
5.2.1.3 “Appropriate level” to recorrect the AWSes bevahiour  
Article 82 of Additional Protocol I states that the advice should be given at 
an ”appropriate level”, but when is the appropriate level? The term is not 
used in an objective sense, in other words each State decides where the 
appropriate level lays within that State. 117 
 
It can easily be stated that this is a very complex and delicate issue, 
especially when the robot is designed to act fast and where a press of a 
button may not be undone for some systems. The failure rate might be high 
where it can practically be almost impossible for an advisor to know when 
the appropriate time is at all.118 One approach could however be that the 
State chooses a level in its military hierarchy where it is most suitable for 
advice to be given, preferably in a post-programming position but pre-attack 
                                                
116 Bolt, (See note12)  page 133. 
117 Ibid., page 139.  
118 Ibid., page 140 
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position. This is for the mere reason that not all situations can be foreseeable 
at the programming stage, yet all factors must be accurately calculated while 
on the field and before a decision to attack is made. All military operations 
have their mistakes and failures; however, the operation can at least be 
properly accurate with this approach.  The appropriate level is not exactly 
defined; the levels could vary depending on the assignment or not exist at 
all. 
5.2.2 A new framework of command responsibility with the 
technical expert 
The concept of command responsibility is a concept that continually has 
been adapted to meet new situations.119 On the one hand, the increasing use 
of contractors, advisors, and other civilian experts will unquestionably blur 
the traditional chains of military command. On the other hand, this change 
in the concept should also allow new possible forms of relationships for 
accountability.120 Warfare has entered a time where sensors and data from 
far away control the weapon systems used on the field, for example the 
machine might operate in Afghanistan while the so called controller is in an 
office in Washington, US. This notion of controlling something from a far 
distance could by itself raise some issues, leaving the machine vulnerable, 
and easily accessible.  
 
The following example will illustrate one of many problems with having 
sensors as the main control. An American unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
was in December 2011 captured by Iranian forces near the city of Kashmar 
in northeastern Iran. The Iranian government announced later that Iran’s 
elite Revolutionary Guards, which claimed to have brought down the UAV 
electronically, brought down the UAV safely. US officials later confirmed 
                                                
119Garraway, Charles, " The Application of Superior Responsibility in an Era of 
Unlimited Information” in International Humanitarian Law and the Changing 
Technology of War, (herein after called Garraway) ed. Saxon, Dan, vol. 41, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2013, page 201. 
120Ibid.,  page 202. 
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that the UAV was captured in Iran but insisted that the UAV crashed and 
was not hijacked by Iran. President Barack Obama also appealed for a return 
of the UAV, to later be refused by the argument that the UAV’s flight over 
Iran was a hostile act and a violation of Iran’s airspace.121  
 
Should a commander be judged by everything done by the weapon system? 
The answer to this question is in the phrase ‘should have known’122, existing 
in Additional Protocol I, which was mentioned in chapter 4.2.1.2. A military 
commander obviously cannot be expected to have personal expert 
knowledge of every piece of information given by the AWS. Nonetheless, 
the commander should have technical expertise in order to filter the 
information given by the AWS so that the commander only receives 
information that is actually necessary for him or her to carry out his or her 
responsibilities, such as proper conduct. It is within the commander’s 
responsibility to make sure that his or her filter system, namely his or her 
subordinates, functions successfully in order to operate correctly according 
to IHL, and if it does not, ensure that failure can be directed to the 
commander in charge. Hence, the new framework of accountability must 
take a collective form, for it to cover all areas of the AWS and all its 
features.  
 
A collective form that could be suggested for the semi-autonomous system, 
including the filter-system, is the ordinary form of command responsibility, 
instead with other actors subordinated to him or her, which will be his or her 
filter system. The military commander will have the overall responsibility, 
as he or she usually has on the battlefield; however, the commander will 
have a technical expert on his team in this case to filter the information 
given by the AWS, to keep track of the weapon system. The reason for this 
is to fill the gap and the lack of intelligence, which continuously has been an 
                                                
121 The information is available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/07/iran-footage-cia-spy-drone, 
accessed on 10 May 2014.  
122 Additional Protocol I, (See note 17) Articles 86(2) and 87.  
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issue with AWSes. Nevertheless, there will never exist a system that is 
completely flawless, but this framework could give the commanders an 
overall understanding of an AWS, and foresee any errors or miscalculations 
in the system before an actual launch, errors that the commander might have 
missed if the expert was not present.  
 
For example, the technical expert can be seated next to the military 
commander and supervise the AWS whenever a target is being attacked. 
The technical expert could provide the military commander with minute-to-
minute advice during the execution of the mission, focusing on the 
interpretation of the AWS, the balance between the necessity of the attack, 
and the collateral damage expected from it as calculated from the AWS. 
This new framework of command responsibility would make it easier to 
conform with the rules in Additional Protocol I where it is established that 
the commander ‘should have known’, even if that information had not 
reached him or her, because the commander should always ensure that his or 
her filter system operates effectively. The new framework would not require 
a change of principle. However this form will plausibly require a greater 
burden on commanders, in the sense that the commander has to ensure that 
his or her staff provides all necessary and relevant information for a proper 
and lawful military operation. The management of information has always 
been a vital element in any military operation, thus it is a matter of military 
common sense to ensure that the commander at all times receives all 
necessary and important information. As outlined in the Yamashita case123: 
 
“There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only 
where the act is directly traceable to [the commander] or where 
his failure properly to supervise his subordinates constitutes 
criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must be a 
                                                
123 Yamashita v. Styer Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, 
327 U.S. 1, U.S.: Supreme Court, 4 February 1946. 
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personal act amounting to a wanton immoral disregard of the 
action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.”124 
 
The expert will provide minute-by-minute information about the AWS, 
tracking its location, calculations, and other intruders, providing information 
to the commander in charge that is vital for its proper functioning. 
The necessity for a filter system is crucial to enable the commander to make 
reliable and correct operational decisions in times of changing technology.  
 
 
 
                                                
124 Garraway, (See note 118) page 205.  
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6 Conclusion  
The character of traditional warfare has now been changed by new 
technologies. Military commanders no longer have the same degree of 
control on the ground or over their domain, since the introduction of 
autonomous weapon systems. The technical changes have had two major 
effects on current international humanitarian law. Firstly, warfare can now 
be conducted and controlled thousands of miles away from the battlefield, 
and secondly, questions arise as to how to manage the information of the 
weapon system. 
Nevertheless, States cannot absolve themselves of their obligations under 
international humanitarian law by contracting the weapon systems on the 
field. The State will still remain responsible for ensuring that the relevant 
and fundamental standards are met and that international law is respected.  
At the present time, we may furthermore conclude that the there is no fully 
autonomous AWS existing, thus making AWSes incompetent to be held 
accountable for crimes under international humanitarian or criminal law. 
Nevertheless, this innovative character of warfare will bring real challenges 
for military commanders, not least in how to manage the information to 
ensure its proper functioning but also to the discipline amongst 
subordinates. An effective system of accountability for the AWS is when 
the lines for responsibility are well defined and definite. To the extent that 
the autonomy of semi-autonomous weapon systems causes gaps in current 
accountability instruments, I will argue that the gaps can be filled through 
the establishment of a new framework of command responsibility with the 
technical expert as a vital subordinate. The technical expert will function as 
a filter system that will filter the information given by the AWS so that the 
commander only receives information that is necessary for him or her to 
carry out his or her responsibilities. The military commander will then have 
the overall responsibility, as he or she usually has on the battlefield. The 
reason for this is to fill the gap and the lack of intelligence, which 
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continuously has been an issue with the new weaponry and also to prevent 
future hijack opportunities when everything is controlled through 
computers. The technical expert’s minute-to-minute advice during the whole 
execution of the mission will help the military commander take accurate 
decisions based on the data from the weapon system, thus making the 
commander responsible for the implementation of IHL and unlawful attacks 
by the AWS. 
My thesis ends now; however this debate has surely only begun.  
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